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ABSTRACT
Under existing law, social media information communicated
through behind password-protected pages receives no
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Note argues that the
Fourth Amendment requires a greater degree of privacy
protection for social media data. Judicial and legislative
activity provides indicia of a willingness to reconsider citizens'
reasonable expectation of privacy and reverse an anachronistic
equation of privacy with secrecy. Government monitoring of
private social media pages constitutes a deeply invasive form of
surveillance and, if government agents employ covert tactics to
gain access to private social media networks, then the Fourth
Amendment controls government use of that private social
media information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyday conversations amongst friends-the sort that
traditionally constituted private speech-now transpire over
social platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedln.
However, unlike traditional "offline" conversations, online
social conversations leave a lasting digital footprint. As such,
social platforms create a trail of digital evidence of an
individual's behavior. With users of social networking sites
increasingly sharing their life experiences online, social
platforms may contain an extensive record of information
documenting an individual's activities, preferences, and
opinions. Moreover, this rise in social sharing of personal
information has been accompanied by a misguided sense of
security that information shared within personal social
networks will remain private. This assumption of data privacy
is not necessarily correct. To the contrary, under the current
legal framework, information shared within private networks
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Information shared on social platforms may offer a
valuable resource to government investigators. For example,
some individuals actually confess to committing crimes to
members of their social network.1 Other social data can help
the government understand motives, track potential threats,
create associative links, confirm alibis, or provide prosecutorial
evidence. While government searches of information are
generally limited to reasonable searches supported by probable
cause, the government has ways to access vast amounts of
social data without triggering the "search" threshold. Social
networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn
allow for data sharing within a closed social network. When
users publish social content, they share that content with the
other members of the private network.
This Note focuses on the reasonable expectation of
privacy in the communications posted on private social media
networks and the accompanying Fourth Amendment
protections against intrusive government searches. An
exploration of the extant case law shows that social media
users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their social
media postings-even if users communicate their information
behind password-protected pages. As such, courts allow the
government to search private social media information without
applying Fourth Amendment protections. The law treats these
"private" social pages as deserving the same protections as if
they were publically posted on the Internet. Therefore, courts
allow the government to search private social media
information without any legally cognizable privacy protections.
This doctrinal stance creates the troubling reality that law
enforcement officials can and do engage in "covert friending"
operations.2
I argue that the Fourth Amendment requires a greater
degree of privacy protection for social media data. Judicial and
legislative activity provides indicia of a willingness to
reconsider citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy and
reverse an anachronistic equation of privacy with secrecy.
Government monitoring of private social media pages
constitutes a deeply invasive form of surveillance. Government
monitoring of social media pages also implicates individuals'
First Amendment rights. While private actors should have the
ability to voluntarily disclose third party social media
1 See e.g. United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the admissibility of defendant's Facebook messages referencing
her carrying marijuana between the United States and Mexico).
2 United States v. Gatson, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014)
("As part of their investigation into Gatson and other co-conspirators, law
enforcement officers used an undercover account to become Instagram
'friends' with Gatson . . . No search warrant is required for the consensual
sharing of this type of information.")
240
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information, the balance between government interests and
privacy interests favors applying Fourth Amendment
safeguards in the case of covert government friending.
II. PRIVACY AND SOCIAL DATA
The proliferation of social technologies has facilitated
the ease with which both private and public actors can collect
personally identifiable data. Many privacy advocates have
watched this and other technological developments with
concern, noting the detrimental effect to consumer privacy. In
fact, this trend has gone so far as to lead some to claim an end
to a reasonable expectation of data privacy.3 However, the law
does not leave consumers without any privacy protection;
individuals enjoy privacy rights deriving from the common law,
statutory protections, and protections stemming from the Bill
of Rights. This Note focuses on the reasonable expectation of
privacy in communications posted on private social media
networks and the accompanying Fourth Amendment
protections against government intrusions.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment grants the American people the
right to remain free from unreasonable governmental
searches.' As interpreted by the Supreme Court, "A 'search'
occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable is infringed."' In Katz v. United States,
the Supreme Court outlined the framework governing this
right in modern case law.' As interpreted by the Court, the
Fourth Amendment poses a requirement for a judicially-
sanctioned warrant for government search behavior that
violates an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."' As
Justice Harlan explains in his Katz concurrence, there are two
elements to assessing the reasonableness of expecting privacy:
a subjective and objective component.
3 See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. R. 1069, 1087 (2014) (noting
"some observers ... write off privacy as a lost cause.")
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . .")
5 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
6 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7 Id.
8 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) ("As Justice Harlan's oft-
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When it comes to social media data, the extent to which
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
social network publications determines whether courts will
consider government searches of social data information
"unreasonable" and therefore protected by the Fourth
Amendment. However, one should note that the Fourth
Amendment serves as a "floor" for privacy protection against
unreasonable government searches. Both federal and state
legislators have the ability to supplement Fourth Amendment
privacy protections, and have done so. For example, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)
establishes requirements and procedures for government actors
intercepting communications as well as accessing stored
information.9
B. Exceptions to the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Digital data, like traditional information, receives a
presumptive privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment.
The government cannot access privately stored information
without obtaining a search warrant backed by probable cause-
individuals have a right to store information without baseless
government interference.0 Citizens may reasonably expect the
greatest level of privacy protection against government
intrusion when actions and speech transpire within the private
confines of an individual's home." On the other hand, citizens
the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable.")
9 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22. In 1986, Congress passed major statutes collectively
known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). ECPA limits
the interception and disclosure of electronic communication. This Note
assumes that ECPA governs the privacy interests implicated in disclosures
from third party providers (both platform providers and non-platform
providers), thereby involving a separate legal regime. This Note restricts the
scope of its analysis to non-provider social media users accessing a social
media network. For cases covering ECPA governance of social media sites,
see, for example, Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp.
2d 659, 669 (D.N.J. 2013) ("Accordingly, the Court finds that non-public
Facebook wall posts are covered by the SCA.") and Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding private
messaging or email services to comprise electronic communication services).
But see Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 854, 863 (2012)
(stating that Crispin reached its conclusion based on stipulations specific to
that case).
10 See supra note 4; Katz, 389 U.S. 347 at 349-350..
11 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 ("At the very core of the Fourth Amendment
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."'); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
587 (1980) ("Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the
archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment."); see
also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1157, 1194 (2004) ("The primary locus of one's
'reasonable expectation of privacy' is of course in the home").
242
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do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
government searches or intelligence- gathering efforts that
occur in public settings or where citizens expose private
information to a third party.3
1. Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine severely cabins Fourth
Amendment protections by creating an exception to the
reasonable expectation of privacy. First articulated in Smith v.
Maryland, the third-party doctrine states that once an
individual invests a third party with information, and
voluntarily agrees to share information with a recipient, '4 the
individual loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information. " While railed against by many privacy
advocates,' Smith still serves as good law.'7
The third-party doctrine served as only a partial
justification for the Smith opinion. Smith found that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy pursuant to
third party disclosure only after first establishing that the
government did not perform a Fourth Amendment search.'
The Court drew on a long-standing jurisprudential distinction
12 See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) ("It has long been
settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject o seizure and may be introduced
in evidence."); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-69
(1971) (outlining the three conditions for the plain view doctrine); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 50 (2015) (explaining the plain view doctrine).
13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); see also United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (finding that defendant had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in bank records stored by third party banks).
14 With the exception of a few special relationships such as a fiduciary duty, a
duty of loyalty, or a privileged relationship.
15 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
16 See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third
Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1 (2013); Andrew J.
Defilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing A Right To Privity In
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1086 (2006)
(challenging the "so-called third-party doctrine"); Erin Murphy, The Case
Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1239 (2009) ("Professor Epstein, Professor Kerr,
and I may at times approach legal questions from different perspectives, but
there is one thing that we all agree upon: the current configuration of third-
party doctrine under the Fourth Amendment is problematic."); Laurie
Buchan Serafino, "I Know My Rights, So You Go'n Need A Warrant For
That": The Fourth Amendment, Riley's Impact, and Warrantless Searches of
Third-Party Clouds, BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 155, 159 (2014) (agreeing with
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012) that third-party doctrine has no place in the digital age).
17 See e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437 (4th Cir. 2016). For a
defense of the third-party doctrine (in a modified form), see Orin Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009).
18 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (distinguishing Smith from Katz on the grounds
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between content and non-content information, where the Court
affords higher protection to contents of a communication.19 For
example, in Ex parte Jackson, the Court found that mailed
letters and sealed packages "are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form
and weight." 20 While the government may freely read the
information on the cover of an envelope, opening the envelope
and searching its contents would violate the Fourth
Amendment.21 Courts have not reached the content versus non-
content distinction when assessing social media
communications. Instead, courts have found the third-party
doctrine dispositive.22
When one applies the third-party doctrine to social
media information, one finds that individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in social media data. As a
result, government agents can presumably gain access to
posted social media data without meeting any probable cause
requirements. As soon as one posts information on a social
platform, the poster discloses information to the third party
platform operator. 23 Moreover, for most social networking
posts, all of the members within a user's social network also
receive access to the published information. In "Wall-to-Wall"-
type conversations between two users,2 4 the rest of the users'
social network functions as third parties to whom the content
publisher and recipient have voluntarily disclosed information.
If the third-party doctrine governs social media behavior, then
published content voluntarily shared among connections within
a private social network loses all reasonable expectation of
privacy, including any reasonable expectation that a user's
19 See Id. See also, In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 129, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the Smith distinction between
content and non-content and the accompanying jurisprudential history).
20 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
21 This distinction has also evolved into the classifications of data and
metadata, where data refers to the contents of the communication, and
metadata serves as the digital equivalent to the outside of the envelope. For
example, in the telephone-tracking context, telephone data refers to the
communications content, and telephone metadata refers to information such
as "telephone numbers dialed (incoming and outgoing), times, and durations
of calls." Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
22 See, e.g., Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 (D.D.C. 2014)
(citing Smith and Miller to find that "when a Facebook user allows 'friends' to
view his information, the Government may access that information through
an individual who is a 'friend' without violating the Fourth Amendment.")
23 However, platform providers are subject to a separate legal scheme under
ECPA and outside the scope of this Note's analysis. See supra note 9.
24 These types of conversations are particularly prevalent on platforms such
as Facebook and Twitter.
244
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connections will not turn over their social data to investigative
authorities.2 5
2. Voluntary Consent
Similar to the third-party doctrine, individuals also lose
a reasonable expectation of privacy when they consent to a
government search of private information. Unlike the third-
party doctrine, which assesses the expectations of privacy of
voluntarily disclosed information, the voluntary consent
exception addresses consent to the search itself. The Supreme
Court declared in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, "It is . . . well
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search
that is conducted pursuant to consent."26 Thus, if an individual
freely consents to a government search, the government may
freely do so.
A Fourth Amendment search does not require
affirmative consent to a search by an announced government
actor. According to the Court, "The Fourth Amendment is
satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the
suspect's consent permitted him [to conduct that search that
was undertaken]."2 7 However, Schneckloth provides a "jealously
and carefully drawn" consent exception to the rule against
unwarranted searches, 28 and only applies when an individual
knowingly and voluntarily submits to a search. As such, the
Court has found that the consent exception cannot plausibly
apply to cases of electronic surveillance.29 The Court reasons,
"The very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use
25 This discussion examines posts that are available to all members with
access to the social network. Users may have a higher reasonable expectation
of privacy for messages communicated through private messenger services.
See R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1142 (D. Minn. 2012) (finding that defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding private Facebook messages).
26 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
27 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); see also United States v. Brooks,
No. 12-CR-166 RRM, 2012 WL 6562947, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (citing
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558
(1980) (listing factors leading to voluntary consent). However, the same
"objectively reasonable" analysis may limit the scope of the permitted search.
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) ("The scope of a license-
express or implied-is limited not only to a particular area but also to a
specific purpose.")
28 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)); William E. Underwood, A Little White Lie:
The Dangers of Allowing Police Officers to Stretch the Truth As a Means to
Gain a Suspect's Consent to Search, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL .RTS. & Soc.
JUST. 167, 176 (2011).
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pursuant to the suspect's consent."30 The Court finds that the
efficacy of electronic surveillance relies on the fact that the
suspect does not know about the surveillance, and finds that
without prior notice, the Schneckloth exception cannot apply.3'
The Schneckloth consent focuses on voluntary and non-
coerced consent for an agent to conduct a search. This consent
remains doctrinally distinct from cases where an individual
does not knowingly consent to a government search, but rather
unknowingly agrees to the presence of an undercover
government agent. Undercover government agents may
lawfully gain access based on a misrepresented identity.32 If an
individual offers lawful access to their private information,
then that person voluntarily assumes the risk that the access
might expose that information to the government. 33 For
example, an undercover officer in a public bookstore does not
violate the Fourth Amendment by accepting an offer to do
business in illegal wares, n4 Hor does an undercover officer's
acceptance to enter an individual's home to conduct an illegal
drug sale pose a constitutional problem.3 5 In both cases, "A
government agent, in the same manner as a private person,
may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon
the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the
occupant."3 6 In both undercover cases, the individual consents
to the agent's access, reflecting an accepted risk that the agent
will use or disclose the exposed information. However, in
neither case does the individual ever grant permission for the
agent to use the information exposed through the business
30 Id.; see also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of
notice to the suspect.")
31 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 463.
32 See, e.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); United States v.
Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) ("If a defendant ...
knowingly exposes his conversations to accomplices, even in a room not
accessible to the general public, his conversations are not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection from disclosure by such accomplices.") (cited by
United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2003)).
33 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (holding that a defendant does not have a privacy
interest in matters voluntarily revealed to a government agent, including a
confidential informant).
34 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985).
35 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (holding that a defendant who
invites an undercover agent into his home for narcotics purchases willingly
reveals information relating to the business transaction does not constitute
an illegal search).
36 Lewis, 385 U.S. at 211 ("During neither of his visits to petitioner's home
did the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in
fact intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal business.") Thus,
to the extent that the undercover agent's presence would be otherwise lawful,
"undercover operations ... are not "searches" under the Fourth Amendment."
See United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Macon,
472 U.S. at 105).
246
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transaction. In sum, the voluntary consent exception to the
requirement for search warrants specifically imagines a narrow
carve-out for the knowing consent to announced government
searches.
III. SOCIAL DATA AND GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING
People regularly mistakenly believe that their social
discussions are private. As privacy scholars have noted, social
networking users consistently underestimate the exposure
inherent in the publication of social information. 3 Social
networks create a sense of a private space, leading people to
converse as if they were behind closed doors and not in the
public view.38 Social conversations often fulfill the subjective
prong of the Katz reasonable expectations test-while users
know that the social networking platforms and other users
within their network have the ability to access their
conversations, they assume that they have a right to privacy.
Below, the Note reviews the existing case law on the
reasonable expectation of privacy in social media information,
and finds that the third-party doctrine results in no reasonable
expectation of privacy in published social data. As a result of
the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the current case
law allows government agents to employ information-gathering
techniques on social data without triggering Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, judicial and legislative activity suggests a
willingness to reconsider the third-party doctrine's improper
equation of privacy with secrecy.
A. Publicly Shared Social Data
Many social media users exhibit a mistaken subjective
expectation of privacy on social platforms even in situations
where the users' privacy settings are set to "public." Some
plaintiffs have tried to argue that they held a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding publicly accessible social
media postings. However, courts have flatly disabused the
37 As James Grimmelman has written, "Over a hundred million people have
uploaded personally sensitive information to Facebook, and many of them
have been badly burnt as a result. Jobs have been lost, reputations smeared,
embarrassing secrets broadcast to the world." James Grimmelman, Saving
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2009).
38 See Id. at 1160 (looking at Facebook and finding that the nature of the
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notion that plaintiffs could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy for publically available social media content. One judge
offered the following consideration of the reasonableness of the
privacy claim:
Consider the following: a man walks to his window,
opens the window, and screams down to a young lady, "I'm
sorry I hit you, please come back upstairs." At trial, the People
call a person who was walking across the street at the time this
occurred. The prosecutor asks, "What did the defendant yell?"
Clearly the answer is relevant and the witness could be
compelled to testify. Well today, the street is an online,
information superhighway, and the witnesses can be the third
party providers like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest,
or the next hot social media application.39
In the above example, Judge Sciarrino, Jr. compares a
public social media post to screaming the content out of an
open window, and that sharing information on the internet is
akin to sharing information in the middle of a public street.
Anyone with an internet connection could access the published
information. The judge concludes that society cannot
reasonably protect the person who expects such behavior to
remain private. Thus, the publisher of this public information
cannot expect the law to protect against government use of the
information. The government did not "search" for this data; the
publisher left this data in plain view of all internet users.o In
short, regardless of subjective intent, the courts have declared
that society refuses to grant an objective expectation of privacy
to information disclosed onto the public internet.
B. Intelligence-Gathering on Private Networks
However, much of social networking data lies within
closed private networks. Unlike publicly available data, which
Judge Scariarrino equated to screaming in the street, data
shared within a private social network more closely resembles
a conversation in a private room. In the latter scenario, the
publisher has made an active effort to shut out strangers. By
limiting the social network's privacy settings to social media
"friends," an individual has shown that "he seeks to preserve
39 People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (Crim. Ct. 2012).
40 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) ("[T]he police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity
that could have been observed by any member of the public."); Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) ("[Ilit has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence."); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, LAW
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[something] as private."4 ' Thus, the protected network forum
naturally operates with greater privacy than the publicly
available alternative. Does this difference have an impact on
the reasonable expectation of privacy against government
access of this data? According to the current case law, it does
not.42 When users post to their social networks, most courts
have ruled that the publishers lose all reasonable expectation
of privacy to that data.
With social media communications, the publisher knows
that the content is being recorded on the website's platform. To
the extent that a publisher "takes a risk that the [social media
connection] may repeat all he hears and observes," 43 the
publisher knows that the social connection has access to the
recorded information. The social media connections can repeat
the shared information to anyone, including government
officials. Just as the social media publisher takes the risk that
his network connections will alert law enforcement to the
content of his posts, that publisher also assumes the risk that a
social media connection is actually an undercover government
agent. As stated in United States v. Miller, "the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining
of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
41 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
42 This Note limits its focus to the surveillance of content-based data, but
recognizes that the social networking websites provide extremely revealing
"non-content" metadata that have traditionally lain outside of the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.
43 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). The Court's
decision in Lopez further supports the proposition that if "friends" can
disclose data from memory, they can also disclose actual recorded content. To
do otherwise, Justice Harlan suggests, would be to suggest a "constitutional
right to rely on possible flaws in ... memory." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 439 (1963).
44 United States v. Brooks, No. 12-CR-166 RRM, 2012 WL 6562947, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) ("Indeed, if Sawyer and Ladeau assumed the risk
that one of his "friends" would alert law enforcement to the fact that he was
trading child pornography, Brooks equally assumes the risk that one of his
"friends" is actually a law enforcement agent.") Brooks appears to conflate the
third-party doctrine and the voluntary consent doctrine. In Part II.B of the
opinion, Judge Mauskopf cites Schneckloth for the proposition that the
defendant had voluntarily (yet unknowingly) consented to a government
search. Id. at *3. Judge Mauskopf continues his analysis by citing cases like
Lewis that concern voluntary consent to covert access, not consent o search.
Id. at *4. The rest of the Brooks' consent analysis pursues the "risk of third
party exposure" reasoning, yet categorizes its reasoning under the
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and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.""
In the following sub-sections, the Note explores the
Fourth Amendment privacy protections against two strategies
that the government may employ to gather its citizens' social
media data. First, a social network connection may voluntarily
turn over published social media information to a government
agent. Second, a covert government agent may request to
directly join an individual's social media network. Under both
strategies, the law allows the government to search and use the
data without the probable cause restraints of the Fourth
Amendment.
1. Sharing Information with the Government
Courts have found that third-party social network
connections have the ability to use data voluntarily shared on
social media and turn that information over to the government.
In the past, some courts have considered the third-party social
connections to be the intended recipients. 4 The law has
traditionally given little protection to ill-considered disclosures,
such as sharing damning evidence within a shared social
network.4 7 Under the existing legal regime, once an individual
voluntarily exposes information to another party, that
individual impliedly waives their privacy rights and cannot
reasonably expect to limit the recipient's usage of that
information. As the Supreme Court articulated, "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."4 8 Under the
third-party doctrine, this use includes the ability to share
received information with the government.49
The Southern District of New York considered the
disclosure of Facebook data to the government in United States
v. Meregildo. In Meregildo, the court recognized that the
45 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Some scholars have critiqued this doctrine,
arguing that controlled disclosures that "represent the limited, focused
sharing of information" between two parties should be seen as a legitimate
transaction between two parties. As a result, they analogize these disclosures
to "communications encompassed by evidentiary privileges," and should not
lose all reasonable expectation of privacy to the information. Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy
Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J. L. & POL'Y 211, 258-259 (2006).
46 See, e.g. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (characterizing a Facebook friend as a party to any social network
conversation).
4 See discussion on government friending, infra Section B.2.
48 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
49 ames Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWAL. REV. 1137, 1197 (2009)
("Similarly, under the third-party doctrine, a Facebook user who makes a fact
known only to a small group of contacts has no Fourth Amendment grounds
for complaint if one of those contacts reveals the fact to the police.").
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defendant "undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile
would not be shared with law enforcement."5 0 However, despite
the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy, he failed the
objective prong. The court found that the defendant "had no
justifiable expectation that his 'friends' would keep his profile
private" . . . because those 'friends' were free to use the
information however they wanted-including sharing it with
the Government." " Due to the fact that the government
received information from a cooperating party with legitimate
access to that information, the government did not perform a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
the Amendment's protections did not apply.5 2
Several other courts have considered the question of
disclosure of third party social media connections' data and
have reached the same conclusion-social media users do not
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy to data
published within a private social media network.53 The courts'
reasons for finding a lack of objective expectation of privacy
have included the notion that people use social networking
sites for the very purpose of connecting with friends and
meeting new people, 1' the fact that individuals knowingly
expose their information to hundreds or thousands of their
* > 55social media connections' own connections, or just as a
50Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
51 Id.
52 See also Palmieri v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 (D.D.C. 2014)
("When a Facebook user allows "friends" to view his information, the
Government may access that information through an individual who is a
"friend" without violating the Fourth Amendment."); Rosario v. Clark Cty.
Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-CV-362 JCM PAL, 2013 WL 3679375, at *6 (D. Nev. July
3, 2013) ("This logic applies with equal force in the social media context.
When a person tweets on Twitter to his or her friends, that person takes the
risk that the friend will turn the information over to the government.")
53E.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315
(N.D. Ga. 2013) ("Even if she had a subjective expectation of privacy in her
Facebook photos, Chaney cannot show that her expectation is legitimate.");
United States v. Brooks, No. 12-CR-166 RRM, 2012 WL 6562947, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) ("In applying this principle to emerging internet
technologies, courts have uniformly held that a user of a private or 'closed'
peer-to-peer network such as GigaTribe who makes available files to his
'friends' does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
those files he shared."); McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-
2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 ("while it is conceivable that a person could use
them as forums to divulge and seek advice on personal and private matters,
it would be unrealistic to expect that such disclosures would be considered
confidential."); United States v. Ladeau, No. CRIM 09-40021-FDS, 2010 WL
1427523, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2010) ("Once Ladeau turned over the
information about how to access the network to a third party, his expectation
of privacy in the network became objectively unreasonable. Because the files
he claims were private were made available to anyone on the network, his
expectation of privacy in those files was also objectively unreasonable.").
54 Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 4403285.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/5
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19
consequence of exposing the information to the entirety of the
private network. 56 Because the courts find the voluntary
exposure of the information dispositive, court have not reached
the question of whether the surveillance of "content" of social
media communications impact the analysis of a reasonable
expectation of privacy. " Due to the lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the social media data, an individual
may allow a government agent access to that person's social
network accounts, and the agent would then have the ability to
search any of that individual's information posted within the
shared network. In sum, courts have consistently held that
agents do not need a search warrant before looking through
social network data provided by a cooperating private party
with access to a protected network. The next section analyzes
the Fourth Amendment restrictions when a covert government
agent adds a social network "friend" to covertly monitor the
friend's network.
2. Covert Government "Friends"
The government may also attempt to access social
networking data more directly-by creating an account and
asking an individual to permit entry into their social network.
Traditionally, parties have no legal recourse to misreading
their friends or from falling prey to overtures by covert
operatives. In Hoffa v. United States, the Court found that
information voluntarily offered to an undercover informant as a
result of misplaced confidence did not represent a legitimate
privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment.8 Similarly, in
Lewis v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the
constitutionality of covert information gathering, relying on an
important government interest in maintaining the ability to
deploy undercover agents.5 9 Together, Hoffa and Lewis stand
for the proposition that "a person does not have a privacy
interest in the loyalty of her friends."o6 As such, if an individual
accepts a friend request from an undercover government agent,
56 Ladeau, 2010 WL 1427523, at *5.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, No. 12-CR-166 RRM, 2012 WL 6562947,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012) (citing Smith for the proposition that one has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties); United States v. Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (same).
58 385 U.S. 293 (1996).
59 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) ("Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in
the case constitutionally prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the
use of undercover agents in any manner is virtually unconstitutional per se.
Such a rule would, for example, severely hamper the Government. . . ").
6 0 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 18 (2015).
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that acceptance provides the same access as if the individual
knowingly exposed permitted their private social media
publications to the government agent.'
The voluntariness of assuming the risk of exposure has
played a key role in cases considering covert government
friending. The mere request to join a private social network
does not violate any privacy interest; asking to join a social
media network draws analogues to an individual knocking on a
door of one's home and requesting to enter. The Supreme Court
has held that "a police officer not armed with a warrant may
approach a home and knock, precisely because that is 'no more
than any private citizen might do."' 62 The friend request itself
does not invade the defendant's privacy rights, and the
defendant may simply reject the request o expose their data to
the requesting party. When the defendant chooses to accept the
friend request, the defendant bears the accompanying risks of
third party disclosure of the private information. This includes
the risk of a government agent accessing and searching their
private information. In United States v. Sawyer, an Ohio
district court noted,
Here, by becoming "friends" with "[covert government
informant] SB," Defendant Sawyer granted the "SB" username
the authority to access any files or folders designated as
shared. The owner of the "SB" name then voluntarily consented
to Agent Couch using that username to access the shared
folders and files on Sawyer's computer. [Doc. 23-3.] It makes
little difference that "SB" was granted authority to access and
download the files on the computer over the internet, rather
than through a grant of physical access to the computer
actually storing those files, particularly since Agent Couch only
accessed the files remotely over the internet.6 3
Even with heightened privacy interests at stake, the
voluntary nature of the Sawyer's acceptance of SB's friend
request strikes a hard blow both against any reasonable
expectation of privacy that SB will not share the information in
the shared files with Agent Crouch. While the defendant's
acceptance of SB's friend request does not constitute a
voluntary consent to a search, by exposing his files to the SB,
the defendant effectively eliminates the Fourth Amendment
privacy protections that would have otherwise limited SB's
search of those files. Since the defendant willingly allowed
access to anyone interested in such material, the acceptance
61 See United States v. Gatson, Crim. No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22
(D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014). However, as noted in Section II.B.2, this type of
voluntary disclosure remains doctrinally distinct from a consensual search.
62 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2001)).
63 United States v. Sawyer, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1357 (N.D. Ohio 2011).
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did not wrongfully infringe upon the defendant's fundamental
property rights. 65 Instead, the defendant relinquished a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the accessible material. As
a rule, just as surveillance does not automatically violate the
Fourth Amendment when conducted in a public place because
the monitored user has no reasonable expectation of privacy,
the surveillance of publically exposed social media data will
generally not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the lack of
a reasonable expectation of privacy. In short, covert
government friends may add and monitor individuals' social
networks without violating the Fourth Amendment.
C. Third-Party Doctrine: A Chink in the Armor
While the third-party doctrine remains good law, it
totters on its last legs-and with good reason. A reasonable
expectation of privacy should not require secrecy as a requisite
condition. The third-party doctrine heavily relies on an
equation between a lack of secrecy arising from information
exposure and an abrogation of any reasonable privacy interest
in that exposed information. As recently as United States v.
Graham, the Fourth Circuit court lamented the doctrine,
proclaiming that if only the doctrinal landscape provided
greater juridical flexibility, the court would have "ceased to
treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy."6 7 Finding its hands
tied by precedent, the judges "recognize the appeal-if we were
writing on a clean slate-in holding that individuals always
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in large quantities of
location information .... [but] the third-party doctrine does not
afford us that option." 6 Instead, "unless and until" the
Supreme Court holds that secrecy is no longer necessary for
privacy, "we are bound by the contours of the third-party
doctrine as articulated by the Court."6 9
The jurisprudential approach of ceasing to equate
secrecy with privacy has a long history, and has gained greater
65 The Sawyer court relies on Sixth Circuit precedent to offer the proposition
that "an undercover officer may gain entrance [to a home] by misrepresenting
his identity and may gather evidence while there." United States v. Sawyer,
786 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting United States v.
Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000)).
66 United States v. Wells, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1273 (N.D. Okla. 2011), aff'd,
739 F.3d 511 (10th Cir. 2014) ("However, neither video nor audio surveillance
automatically violates the Fourth Amendment; when such surveillance is
conducted in a public place such as a bank, where no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists, the surveillance is not subject to suppression.")
67 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
68 Id.
69 Id (citation omitted).
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support in recent years. In 1967, Katz v. United States, the
Court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy to the contents of his communication, despite the fact
that he had voluntarily communicated via a service that
enabled the telephone company to monitor his calls. To
According to the Katz Court, if a person seeks to keep
information private, even in a publically accessible area, then
that information may be constitutionally protected. Smith
distinguished the Katz ruling by highlighting the difference
between monitoring which captures the content of
communications versus monitoring that does not capture
content.72 As a result, capturing non-content information does
not constitute a constitutional search. 7 The surveillance of
social media communications concerns the contents of
communication, thereby invoking the Katz analysis.74
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit rejected
the notion that the risk of third party exposure necessarily
erases a reasonable expectation of privacy. 75 The court
distinguished electronic communications from bank records in
United States v. Miller 76 and explicitly found that "the mere
ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a
communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable
expectation of privacy."7 The Warshak judges justified their
distinction on the basis that Miller concerned "simple bank
records," as opposed to deeply confidential information and
that the depositor disclosed the bank records for the bank's use
70 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.") Going
even further back, the Court ruled in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)
that individuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy to the contents of
their mail even though the post office had the ability to open the mail.
71 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
72 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
7 3 1d.
74 Smith and Katz dealt with monitoring through electronic interception,
while social media surveillance occurs after the reception of the electronic
transmission. This technical variation in monitoring methods should not
impact the privacy analysis. In the social media context, the government does
not intercept social media messages in electronic transit, but monitors them
once they reach their intended destination. While the Stored
Communications Act and Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22) may create a
statutory distinction, the Fourth Amendment concern over covert government
electronic surveillance encompasses both scenarios. As Katz emphasizes, the
constitutional violation arises not from the interception of communication,
but from the fact that the government conducted electronic surveillance
without meeting "the procedure of antecedent justification." Katz, 389 U.S. at
358.
75 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
76 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
77 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286-87. By identifying the communications as
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in the ordinary course of business.8 Warshak's distinctions can
apply to social media information as well. Several courts have
also found that the disclosure of cell site location information
does not preclude reasonable expectations of privacy under the
third-party doctrine. 79 New York courts have also stridently
objected to the application of the third-party doctrine to digital
data.o
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest a limited
application of third-party doctrine to electronic data, yet the
Court has not overruled the third-party doctrine. Justice
Sotomayor's concurring opinion in United States v. Jones
provides an early indication of an unwillingness to apply the
third-party doctrine to digital data. In United States v. Jones,
Justice Sotomayor highlighted the fact that digital information
such as GPS monitoring produces "a wealth of detail about [an
individual's] familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations." 81 Access to such data reveals private
information about one's social connections, and this chills one's
"associational and expressive freedoms." 82 The extent of
exposure leads Justice Sotomayor to conclude that sheer
amount of informational data gathered in some types of
78 Id. at 288.
79 See e.g., In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2015), appeal dismissed
(Feb. 5, 2016) ("[Tihe Court concludes that historical CSLI generated via
continuously operating apps or automatic pinging does not amount to a
voluntary conveyance of the user's location twenty-four hours a day for sixty
days."); United States v. Cooper, No. 13-CR-00693-SI-1, 2015 WL 881578, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) ("[T]he pen registers employed in 1979 bear little
resemblance to their modern day counterparts."); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d
504, 523 (Fla. 2014), reh'g denied (Dec. 8, 2014) ("The Supreme Court, in
stating this principle, has clearly recognized protection of 'personal and
societal values' regarding expectations of privacy that a society is willing to
recognize even where such activities are not fully concealed." (citing
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986)). But see United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) ("All of our sister circuits to have
considered the question have held, as we do today, that the government does
not violate the Fourth Amendment when it obtains historical CSLI from a
service provider without a warrant."); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498,
514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (finding that recent
Supreme Court decisions "leave the third-party doctrine untouched"); In re
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013) ("This
crabbed understanding of voluntary conveyance would lead to absurd
results.").
80 See e.g. People v. Thompson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 237, 251 (2016) ("At a time when
many people routinely relay sensitive personal information by email, the
assertion that no Fourth Amendment protections apply to such
communications because email requires an email account, in this Court's
view, is an archaic notion which negates the protection of the Fourth
Amendment for many of our most private communications.")
81 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 956.
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electronic surveillance methods violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy and constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the voluntary exposure. In
dicta, Justice Sotomayor goes even further, suggesting the need
to reconsider the third-party doctrine, noting that the rule is
"ill suited to the digital age."83
Finally, in Riley v. California, an eight Justice majority
cited Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Jones to find
that a warrantless search of a smartphone's call log violated
the Fourth Amendment, even when that search was conducted
incident to arrest.4 Relying on the quantitative and qualitative
differences in electronic data, the Court found that the
pervasiveness of the digital information stored on cell phones
requires greater privacy protections than a traditional search
would mandate. "' While the government legitimately
confiscated the defendant's cell phone incident to arrest, the
defendant still maintained a privacy interest in the contents in
the cell phone despite the third party exposure.6
Legislative activity also offers some support for
overturning the notion that society necessitates secrecy for a
reasonable expectation of privacy. ECPA served as an early
inhibitor to third party disclosure, mandating that electronic
communications providers faced barriers to disclosing private
wire, oral, and electronic communications information relayed
through their networks.7 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) limits third party disclosures,
despite that fact that the individual has exposed his or her data
to medical professionals. 88 While the ACLU notes that
government agents can circumvent the HIPAA protections with
83 1d. at 957. Judge Leon went so far as to refuse to apply the third-party
doctrine to NSA surveillance, asking if "present-day circumstances-the
evolutions in the Government's surveillance capabilities, citizens' phone
habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies-[are]
so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years
ago that a precedent like Smith simply does not apply?" Klayman v. Obama,
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). For an academic analysis of the third-party
doctrine post Jones, see Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones,
After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431
(2013).
84 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) ("[A] warrant is generally
required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to
arrest.").
851d. at 2494-95.
86 1d. at 2493.
87 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Jul. 30, 2013),
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285.
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relative ease,8 9 the legislation still reinforces the notion that
privacy does not necessarily require secrecy. Thus, Congress
has indicated that it does not want to equate privacy with
secrecy. To the extent that Congressional intent reflects
society's notions of reasonable expectations of privacy,
legislative action indicates society's willingness to extend an
expectation of privacy to private-but-not-secret information.
Since "personal and societal values" influence the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis in the Fourth Amendment
context, 90 legislative indicia of society's privacy expectations
outline the proper contours for Fourth Amendment protections.
In sum, while the third-party doctrine still reigns
supreme, judicial decisions consistent with legislative activity
have slowly undercut the third-party doctrine's core equation
between secrecy and privacy. Courts have begun to discuss the
inapt appropriation of the old third-party doctrine to the
reasonable expectation of privacy in a digital world. The
following section argues that privacy interests implicated in
social media surveillance offer a particularly robust case for
demonstrating the need for the Fourth Amendment to better
protect the privacy vulnerabilities created by modern digital
behavior.
IV. REVISITING THE SCOPE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATION
OF PRIVATE SOCIAL DATA
An increasingly powerful chorus of judicial voices has
called for a reconsideration of the reasonable expectation of
privacy for digital information.91 The academic community has
also grappled with the meaning of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an increasingly omni-connected world, 92 and has
found the third-party doctrine "horribly wrong."93 For example,
89 FAQ On Government Access To Medical Records, Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, http://www.aclu.org/faq-government-access-medical-records.
90 Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 523 (Fla. 2014), reh'g denied (Dec. 8, 2014)
("The Supreme Court, in stating this principle, has clearly recognized
protection of 'personal and societal values' regarding expectations of privacy
that a society is willing to recognize even where such activities are not fully
concealed." (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986)).
91 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016)
(recognizing that Circuit Court judges would like to see a change to third-
party doctrine, but must wait for Supreme Court action).
92 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1222-25 (2016) (reconceptualizing
online service providers as subject to governance as information fiduciaries).
93 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563-64 (2009) ("The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule
scholars love to hate.... The verdict among commentators has been frequent
and apparently unanimous: The third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but
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William Baude and James Stern have advocated applying a
positive law model to replace the third party-doctrine.9 4 David
Sklansky believes that a reasonable expectation of privacy test
misreads the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, and that courts
must refocus on privacy as a sovereign zone of sanctuary.95 Jed
Rubenfeld has also considered the detrimental effects of
technological developments on privacy interests in his aptly-
named article, "The End of Privacy." Like Sklansky, Rubenfeld
contends that courts must refocus Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence away from the "Stranger Principle" embedded in
the third-party doctrine in order to maintain a cognizable
Fourth Amendment protection in the modern era.96
In this section, I argue that courts should reconsider the
reasonable expectation of privacy of social data. I contend that
government monitoring of private social media pages invades
an even greater privacy interest than that of the home. I also
argue that allowing for government monitoring of social media
pages implicates individuals' First Amendment rights. Finally,
I find that the balance between government interests and
privacy interests favors applying Fourth Amendment
safeguards in the case of covert friending, yet leaving voluntary
information disclosures by third party connections beyond the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
A. Special Considerations of Privacy for Private Social Media
Data
While privacy advocates have many reasons to push for
a broad reversal of the third-party doctrine, social media use
offers an exceptionally striking case for the need to narrow the
third-party doctrine loophole to Fourth Amendment
protections. Under the governing third-party doctrine, social
media users have no reasonable expectation of privacy of any
horribly wrong." (footnotes omitted)); see also David Alan Sklansky, Too
Much Information: How Not To Think About Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1089 (2014) ("An all-or-nothing
approach to privacy- -denying that people have any interest in controlling the
use or dissemination of information that is less than fully confidential--has
long been, with justification, one of the most heavily criticized aspects of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." (footnote omitted)).
94 William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARv. L. REV. 1821, 1871-73 (2016) (advocating the
application of a positive law model to replace third-party doctrine).
95 Sklansky, supra note 92 at 1107-10.
96 See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 113 (2008)
("The only problem: the Stranger Principle is completely untenable. It implies
that, once an individual has exposed information to a third party, the
government may seize that information--with or without that third party's
assistance. And that implication would spell the end of the Fourth
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information that they post on their private networks because of
the information exposed to their social media connections.97
Allowing a general right to third party disclosure of private
information for government use enables a relatively easy
means of conducting invasive, widespread surveillance. Due to
social media users' vulnerability to third party infiltration,
active government surveillance can also dampen citizens' will
to voice private dissent and exert a chilling effect on free
speech.
1. Intrusive Social Media Monitoring
At present, government agents have the expansive
ability to search private social media information, either
through covert agent friending or through the cooperation of a
social media friend. This creates the threat of extremely
invasive violations of one's privacy. A search of social media
information often reveals far more than a search of an
individual's home, the archetypical locus of Fourth Amendment
protections.9 8 A government search of a private social media
page can therefore pose an even more invasive threat to an
individual's privacy. 99 Due to the plethora of associational and
other intimate information repeatedly available through a
user's social media homepage, government monitoring proves
tantamount to ongoing surveillance. Like other forms of audio
and video surveillance, social media monitoring tracks an
unknowing user's behavior for extended periods of time. As a
general rule, courts apply the Fourth Amendment more strictly
to protect individuals where the government utilizes more
intrusive methods of performing searches.100
Courts have distinguished the privacy intrusions
implicated in a singular search versus those in a case of
ongoing surveillance. Outside of the Fourth Amendment
context, in the well-known Nader case, Chief Judge Fuld
recognized that while "the mere observation of the plaintiff in a
public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy....
97 See supra p. 6.
98 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491; Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
99 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[An
explosion of Internet-based communication has taken place. People are now
able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends,
family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings,
and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse
button.").
100 See e.g., United States v. Wells, 739 F.3d 511, 518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 73 (2014); see also United States v. Shabazz, 883 F. Supp. 422, 424
(D. Minn. 1995) (finding that the government's video and audio surveillance
of a rented hotel room was "so massive and unregulated as to require the
suppression of its product").
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under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so
'overzealous' as to render it actionable."' The court goes on to
state, "a person does not automatically make public everything
he does merely by being in a public place."102 In other words,
the New York Court of Appeals found that merely exposing
oneself to a public place does not compromise all legitimate
expectation to privacy rights, and an extended surveillance
campaign may breach an individual's right to privacy.
Other courts have applied a similar distinction between
short searches and long-term surveillance when assessing
government behavior. For example, in Jones, Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Alito's concurring opinions
differentiated between "short-term monitoring of a person's
movements on public streets,' which would not infringe a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and 'longer term GPS
monitoring,' which would." 103 Similarly, the circuit court case
leading to the Jones decision found evidence of state laws
suggesting a "nationwide societal understanding" that
prolonged GPS surveillance "defeats an expectation of privacy
that our society recognizes as reasonable."104 The D.C. Circuit
court advanced a "mosaic theory of government surveillance,
emphasizing that a key difference between a limited search
and ongoing surveillance rests on the fact that the whole
"reveals more-sometimes a great deal more-than does the
sum of its parts." 105 In United States v. Nerber, the Ninth
Circuit cites Ninth Circuit precedent06 as well as decisions
from the Fifth Circuit, 107 Seventh Circuit, 108 and Tenth
101 Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 570 (1970) (citation omitted);
cf United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2013)
("[Warrantless long-term tracking by electronic means violates an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy . . . because the information
obtained through such means is, in the aggregate, so comprehensive.")
102 Nader, 25 N.Y.2d, at 570.
103 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012)) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
104 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
105 Id. at 558, ("Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not
revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly,
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information
can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in
isolation.")
106United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he silent,
unblinking lens of the camera was intrusive in a way that no temporary
search of the office could have been.")
107 See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987)
(arguing that society considers Orwellian hidden video surveillance as more
egregious than other kinds of intrusions).
108 See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We think
it . . . unarguable that television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive,




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/5
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19
Circuit, 109 emphasizing the exceptionally intrusive nature of
electronic video surveillance.110 The Nerber Court also directly
quoted Judge Kozinski, stating that "every court considering
the issue has noted [that] video surveillance can result in
extraordinarily serious intrusions into personal privacy.... If
such intrusions are ever permissible, they must be justified by
an extraordinary showing of need."111 As such, case precedents
suggest a higher bar for allowing warrantless government
surveillance activity than a discrete search, indicating that
warrantless social media monitoring amounts to "an
extraordinary intrusion into personal privacy." 1 12
The Ninth Circuit later distinguished the Jones decision
as addressing only exceptionally invasive levels of surveillance.
In United States v. Wahchumwah, the Circuit court explored a
case where the defendant invited an undercover agent into the
defendant's home, and the agent used a concealed audio-visual
device during the course of the visit. 113 The court found
significant that the surveillance only lasted for a few hours
(versus the 48-hour GPS surveillance in Jones) and that the
surveillance only transpired while the agent remained in the
defendant's home. 114 When the government gathers private
social media via surveillance techniques, the government could
conceivably undertake searches limited to few hours, but
agents would more likely conduct surveillance for a more
extensive time period. The monitoring would therefore fall into
the exceptionally invasive category even under the
Wahchumwah test. Such a position remains consistent with
Katz's requirement for procedural safeguards to prevent
permission for searching electronic surveillance to lay "only in
the discretion of the police."115
indiscriminate, and that it could be grossly abused--to eliminate personal
privacy as understood in modern Western nations.").
109 See United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990)
("Because of the invasive nature of video surveillance, the government's
showing of necessity must be very high to justify its use"); see also United
States v. Wells, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1273 (N.D. Okla. 2011), aff'd, 739 F.3d
511 (10th Cir. 2014) (Video and audio surveillance are highly intrusive forms
of investigative mechanisms and, for that reason, have been subjected to a
high level of scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment and the wiretap statute,
with video surveillance deemed even more intrusive than audio 'bugging.'
(citation omitted)).
110 United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2000).
111 Id. At 603 (citing United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
112 Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603.
113 United States v. Wahchumwah, 710 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2013).
114 1d. at 868 ("[Tlhe GPS device in Jones enabled constant surveillance of a
vehicle over a period of twenty-eight days, id. at 948, whereas the recording
by Agent Romero lasted for only a few hours and for no longer than Romero
remained an invited guest in Wahchumwah's home.")
115 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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Courts have also found that the greater intrusiveness of
new technologies require judges to reinforce constitutional
safeguards to ensure that technological innovations do not
erode traditional Fourth Amendment protections. For example,
in People v. Weaver, the New York state court recognized that
contemporary technology projects our private activities into
public space as never before."116 However, the court argued that
the technological advancement had not "been accompanied by
any dramatic diminution in the socially reasonable expectation
that our communications and transactions will remain to a
large extent private."117 Stated more broadly, the Weaver court
adopted the position that technological developments should
not dictate the level of privacy that society finds reasonable.
While the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo v. United States
suggested that technology's integration into public use could
eventually affect the analysis of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy, Kyllo agreed with Weaver's main thrust
that technology should not dictate reasonable expectations of
privacy.118 The Sixth Circuit in Warshak interpreted Kyllo to
stand for the proposition that courts needed to update the
Fourth Amendment to "keep pace with the inexorable march of
technological progress, or its guarantees will wither and
perish." 119 Thus, as technologies allow for more invasive
surveillance, courts must ensure that the Fourth Amendment
safeguards remain agile in protecting a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
Finally, the fact that the government monitors private
communications when searching social media data further
bolsters the need for a strict application of Fourth Amendment
protections. The Supreme Court has ruled that "broad and
unsuspected government incursions into conversational privacy
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment
safeguards." 120 As the discussion above demonstrates,
government surveillance of social media data is both broad in
scope and unsuspected by the social media publisher. Even in
116 People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 442-43, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (2009).
1 17 Id.; see also State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 263, 76 P.3d 217, 224
(2003) ("[Ulse of a device that enabled the police to locate a person within a
40-mile radius day or night 'is a significant limitation on freedom from
scrutiny' and 'a staggering limitation upon personal freedom."') (citing State
v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 172, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (1988)).
118 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (suggesting that whether or
not a surveying technology has entered general public use may affect the
analysis of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, but reinforcing
that changing technological abilities should not override expectations of
privacy "with roots deep in the common law").
119 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).
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Smith, which developed the third-party doctrine, the Court
found that the degree of the surveillance's intrusiveness affects
the speaker's reasonable xpectation of privacy (and thus
impliedly the reasonableness of applying the third-party
doctrine).121 In sum, the particularly invasive nature of social
media surveillance lends itself to a high level of privacy
protection even in the case of limited third-party disclosures.
2. The Chilling Effect of Surveillance
Social media users have shown themselves to make poor
privacy judgments. If the government can gather information
without users' knowledge, the government surveillance
practices would likely exert a chilling effect on private speech
within social media networks.12 2
The empirics suggest that carelessness and a lack of
information surrounding their social networking privacy
render individuals extremely vulnerable to covert friend
requests. As a result, the problem of misplaced trust appears to
have vastly amplified in the social networking context, despite
the disclosure of far more privacy-intrusive information. For
example, one study found that forty-one percent of Facebook
users would add a user posing as a plastic frog as a friend
connection. In other words, nearly half of the study's users
agreed to disclose their personal information despite the clear
indication that by adding the "frog" connection, they shared
personal information with an unknown stranger. 123 Another
study of college students showed that "between twenty and
thirty percent did not know how Facebook's privacy controls
worked, how to change them, or even whether they themselves
had ever changed them."12 4
One might respond by contending that this problem has
an easy solution-social media users should take greater care
121 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (holding that the pen
registers did not capture content of communications and therefore played a
less intrusive role).
122 The academic literature offers a robust analysis on the chilling effects of
surveillance. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network
Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1441, 1442 (2011); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 143-44 (2007); Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by
Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of
Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 621, 656-57 (2004); Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling
Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117
(2016).
123 James Grimmelman, Saving Facebook, 94 IOwAL. REV. 1137 (2009) (citing
Sophos Facebook ID Probe Shows 41% of Users Happy to Reveal All to
Potential Identity Thieves, SOPHOs (Aug. 14, 2007), http://
www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2007/08/facebook.html).
124 Lauren Amy Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and 'Blurry-Edged' Social
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315 (2009).
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in accepting individuals into their social networks. While it is
undoubtedly true that individuals could greatly mitigate the
threat by exercising greater caution in accepting unknown
friend requests, it does not eliminate the problem altogether. 125
First, the nature of social networks creates incentives to share
information with friends of friends, 126 but in order to reach
those connections, the user has to trust that none of their
hundreds or thousands of social connections has mistakenly
added an undercover agent. Moreover, even if a user does not
reveal their posts to second-degree connections, the mere
revelation of an individual's information to a more immediate
social network may implicate important privacy interests.
Even if no one accepted unknown social media access
requests, covert government friending would still pose a
problem. A covert agent could meet an individual in person
before adding them on social media, thus providing a more
compelling reason for acceptance. Through this tactic, covert
agents could exercise invasive and suspicionless surveillance
on a discrete group of people. For example, if a law enforcement
agent wanted to monitor the behavior of a religious community,
the agent could show up at a house of worship and meet
members of the community. In this context, a subsequent
friend request would not seem unwarranted, and the
government agent would have extensive access to the privacy of
the minority network, despite the lack of any reasonable
suspicion. An agent could undertake this type of operation
against another religious group, neighborhood community, or
political group. As such, allowing covert friending may
facilitate the very unreasonable searches that the Fourth
Amendment aims to prevent.
This scenario of covert government "friending" does not
exist in a hypothetical academic vacuum. To the contrary, the
New York Times has reported that government agents have
turned to social media sites to identify individuals who the FBI
125 An informed minority problem poses a further problem to creating better
privacy practices on social media platforms. Many platforms have overcome
the informed minority problem by allowing users to custom-tailor their
privacy settings. Thus, those users best educated about the privacy threats of
social media use will set their privacy settings very narrowly or will not use
the social media sites at all. However, the lack of transparency concerning
the privacy settings of one's social media connections means that social media
sites can mollify those most aware of the privacy risks while leaving the
majority uninformed. See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's
Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect
Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 656 (1996).
126 As Grimmelman finds, "Weak ties are essential for networking (whether it
be finding a job or a spouse)." James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94
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suspects of harboring a propensity for terrorism. 127 For
example, an undercover agent sent a friend request to Hasan
Edmonds, a suspected ISIS sympathizer, and maintained an
online relationship that led to Edmonds' arrest on terrorism-
related offenses. 128 Despite the FBI's widespread access to
Edmonds' social media usage, the government did not ever
need to approach a court to demonstrate the reasonable nature
of its intrusive tracking into Edmonds' life. Moreover, the
agents had no obligation to limit their search to Edmonds' own
communication-when Edmonds allowed the agent access into
his private social network, he also enabled the agent to monitor
the social networking behavior of all of Edmonds' friends
without any Fourth Amendment barriers.
Furthermore, social media usage has risen in
prominence1 29 to the extent that it plays a "vital role . . . in
private communication."1 30 As a result, the use of social media,
like the use of traditional forms of communication, implicates
free speech issues. Social media users leverage their platforms
to air unpopular opinions within a safe, limited-access
community. For example, in the wake of recent police
shootings, some citizens expressed their approval of police
violence.13 1 While incitement to violence may result in criminal
charges, one may expect that many others may legitimately
fear government surveillance even without anything illicit to
hide. As the Supreme Court notes, "History abundantly
documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent
and benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most
fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections
become the more necessary when the targets of official
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their
political beliefs." 132 Thus, a key feature motivating Fourth
127 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Steps Up Use of Stings in ISIS Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 7, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/fbi-isis-terrorism-
stings.html.
128 Id.
129 See e.g., Maeve Duggan, The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW
RES. CENT., (Aug. 19, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-
demographics-of-social-media-users (finding that fully 72% of online
American adults use Facebook-a percentage that increases to 82% and 79%
when analyzing the behavior of 18-29 year-olds and 30-49 year-olds,
respectively).
130 Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
131 Naomi LaChance, After Dallas Shootings, Police Arrest People for
Criticizing Cops on Facebook and Twitter, INTERCEPT (Jul. 12, 2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/07/12/after-dallas-shootings-police-arrest-
people-for-criticizing-cops-on-facebook-and-twitter.
132 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S.
297 (1972). See also Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEx. L. REv. 387,
389 (2008) ("Surveillance or interference can warp the integrity of our
freedom of thought and can skew the way we think, with clear repercussions
for the content of our subsequent speech or writing. The ability to freely make
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Amendment privacy protections relates to rights of free
expression.
Courts have long considered the Fourth Amendment as
a bulwark against infringements on private speech.133 In the
Keith Case, the Supreme Court expressed its concern that
unchecked surveillance would chill freedom of speech. 134
Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its
broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable
surveillance.
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of
subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the
fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous
citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public
discourse, is essential to our free society.135
The Keith Court, writing over forty years ago, feared
that allowing the government broad surveillance powers for
national security matters would adversely affect the nation's
public discourse. If citizens did not feel that they could express
their thoughts in private spaces without fearing the notice of
government listeners, citizens would not air their thoughts and
dissent aloud and private discourse would suffer. As a result,
the Court found that the electronic surveillance of defendants
plotting to threaten national security still required a court-
approved search warrant.136 While the facts in Keith concern a
matter of national security, the court's reasoning applies even
more strongly regarding government surveillance without a
specific national security justification. The Court addresses
this explicitly: "Official surveillance, whether its purpose be
criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks
infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech."1 37
Despite the Court's ruling that private speech considerations
mandate a search warrant for government surveillance ven in
up our minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a substantial
measure of intellectual privacy. In this way, intellectual privacy is a
cornerstone of meaningful First Amendment liberties.")
133 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court clarified
that the First Amendment applies to speech on the Internet. 521 U.S. at 885
(1997).
134 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
135 Id at 313-314.
136 Id. at 320.
137 Id. However, as recognized in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972),
surveillance must be accompanied by a search; the potential for government
behavior to create a subjective chilling effect on speech does not provide
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national security situations, if a government agent adds an
individual on a social network, that agent can monitor the
entire social network without a search warrant without
individualized suspicion. The risk of such extensive exposure
could have "a most pernicious effect upon the dignity of man
and it would surely lead to guarded conversations."138 The fear
of covert social media surveillance, particularly if the practice
continues to emerge into widespread use, "is susceptible to
abuse"139 and could result in a severe chilling effect on private
speech. Free speech concerns weigh in favor of limiting covert
government surveillance.140 As a result of the intrusiveness of
social media monitoring, combined with public reliance on
private social media networks as a forum for private speech,
private social network data should receive a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
B. Distinguishing Government Intelligence Tactics
Now that the Note has argued for a presumptive
expectation of privacy, this Section will distinguish the two
government intelligence- gathering tactics introduced in Part
III.A. Despite the presumptive expectation of privacy in social
media data, this Section contends that the government should
have the ability to access social media information shared by a
private friend without triggering the Fourth Amendment.
Third party disclosures undertaken by cooperative social
connections should not lie subject to Fourth Amendment
protections. On the other hand, covert friending that results in
indiscriminate searches of a private citizen's social data
deserves a higher level of privacy protection.
Even if the third-party doctrine does not automatically
negate all reasonable expectations of privacy in exposed
information, citizens must still justify the expectation of
privacy in consensually shared data. After all, social media
users accept their friends with the assumption that their
friends will access their published material. 141 As such,
publishers have no illusion that no one will read their social
138 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
139 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
140 United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2007) articulates a
balancing test, finding that ". . . an investigation threatening First
Amendment rights, like any government investigation, be justified by a
legitimate law enforcement purpose that outweighs any harm to First
Amendment interests."
141 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) ("A government agent, in the
same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business
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media posts-in fact, social media elicits responses from other
social media users in the network that explicitly remind
posters that other users see their published social media
information. 142
Individuals must demonstrate a vital privacy interest to
overcome their voluntary disclosure of social media
information. In the case of voluntary third party disclosures to
the government, the searched party cannot demonstrate such a
high privacy interest. Both the government's more limited
surveillance capacity as well as the disclosing party's First
Amendment rights weighs towards allowing the government to
freely search information disclosed by a third-party connection.
1. Surveillance Capacity
The nature of the cooperating party's consent limits the
scope of the government's ability to search the disclosed social
connection's network. A government agent would only have
access to the information that the cooperating party chose to
disclose.1 43 If a third party shared access information to their
social network account with an agent, the government may
have a limited ability to wander through the social network
unless the disclosing party had already viewed those files. In
Walter v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
government could not view films provided by a private party
that the private actors had not previously viewed. 144 However,
the Court also found an exception for items in "plain view."145
Due to the fact that the government would need to conduct
digital searches to pull up the relevant information, searching
the social media network for additional information would
likely constitute "a significant expansion of the search" and
require a search warrant. 146 This is particularly likely given
142 This dynamic creates a contrast to United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597,
604 (9th Cir. 2000), where the privacy damage came in part from a false
sense of being alone.
143 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657, 100 S. Ct. 2395, 2402, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 410 (1980) ("If a properly authorized official search is limited by the
particular terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of strict
limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of
another person's privacy.")
144 Id. (The projection of the films was a significant expansion of the search
that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must be
characterized as a separate search.")
145 Id. ("Even though some circumstances-for example, if the results of the
private search are in plain view when materials are turned over to the
Government-may justify the Government's re-examination of the materials,
surely the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless
it has the right to make an independent search.")
146 Id. See also United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2013)
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the Court's decision in Riley v. California, 147 limiting a
warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest due to the
invasive nature of searching such a vast store of digital data.
For similar reasons, the government would probably not have
permission to use an exposed account to view social media
information published after the cooperating party exposed the
social media data without receiving express consent.
Even if a third party could hand over a password and
allow for an ongoing search without previously viewing all
searched material, the fact that the duration and secrecy of the
search would depend upon ongoing private party cooperation
offsets the degree of privacy harm. When the government gains
access to social media data through a cooperating party, the
government has a more limited search capability-limited in
both scope and time. For example, Meregildo involved a
cooperating witness providing access to Facebook data, so the
information that the government received remained contingent
upon cooperating party's continued cooperation. 148 The
cooperating party had the power to revoke government access
to future social media data at any time, or could selectively
share the information given to government agents.
In contrast, when a government agent gains direct
access to social media communication, the target connection's
consent allows for a far more expansive form of surveillance.
Once an individual consents to an uncover agent's friend
request, the agent has unfettered access to all of the target
individual's social media data, as well as significant amounts of
information from "friends of friends."14 9 Without a private actor
mitigating the government control over tracking an individual's
activities, government monitoring imposes the level of
extraordinarily intrusive surveillance addressed in Part
IV.A. 1.150
While government actors can take advantage of
preexisting social media relationships, asking an individual to
request access to another individual's social network for the
express purpose of searching the target user's social data may
pose an additional difficulty. The Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches undertaken by private parties, but only when
147 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
148 This analysis sets aside the question of whether giving unrestricted access
to another party violates the Terms of Service of a given social network,
which goes beyond the scope of this Note.
149 See United States v. Wahchumwah, 710 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the amount of time of a surveillance operation may substantively
effect the privacy analysis). Once an individual accepts a covert agent's friend
request, they can expect to remain friends for years.
150 In United States v. Gatson, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22 (D.N.J. Dec. 16,
2014), Judge Martini dismissed these concerns with a cursory paragraph
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those parties do not act as agents on the government's behalf.
151 If the government commissioned the friend request, then the
friend request constitutes government behavior and would fall
under the covert friending analysis. 152 Due to the fact that
disclosures by a cooperating party require the consent of a
private intermediary, government surveillance capacity
remains in greater check than the unchecked surveillance
allowed through covert government friending.
2. First Amendment Rights
Regardless of how the third-party doctrine develops,
private social media users should not face limits in their ability
to disclose social media information to the government. Social
media users have a far more direct relationship with their
connections than they do with third party operators. Moreover,
as discussed above, users post the information on their social
media network for the benefit of their social connections. In
fact, restricting social media connections to disclose
troublesome material to law enforcement could infringe upon
the social connections' First Amendment free speech rights. As
the Court notes in Fernandez v. California, "Any other rule
(that would forbid consensual disclosures) would trample on
the rights of the occupant who is willing to consent." 153
Specifically, a third party connection might want the police to
conduct a search in order to dispel any suspicion raised by their
association with the suspect in question. 154
Moreover, forbidding voluntary disclosures by
cooperating third parties instills a socially detrimental policy.
If a social media user finds that one of their social connections
posts something so worrisome that the user turns to the police
for help, it seems irrational to interfere with that report. While
turning over social media data to law enforcement may violate
the standard social norms governing social media use, limiting
those disclosures would adversely affect communal well-being.
Therefore, under any presumption of a reasonable expectation
of privacy, 155 the law should not seek to limit third party
151 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984).
152 For example, the Tenth Circuit utilized a two part test, asking "1) whether
the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2)
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement
efforts or to further his own ends." United States v. Ackerman, 2014 WL
2968164, at *7 (D. Kan. July 1, 2014). If the private party's friend request
counts as government behavior, then the act receives an identical privacy
analysis to cases where a covert government agent solicits social network
access.
153 Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137, 188 L. Ed. 2d 25 (2014).
154 Id.
155 And the fact that many users do not exhibit a subjective understanding
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disclosures from a cooperating party. In contrast, covert
friending involves government actors acting in an official
capacity, so these free speech concerns do not weigh as
heavily. 156
3. Power Differential
One might also challenge the distinction between
government intelligence-gathering via a cooperating party and
intelligence-gathering via covert government friending as
involving the same level of risk. After all, if a defendant
assumed the risk that one of his "friends" would alert law
enforcement to the fact that he had committed a crime, the
defendant equally assumes the risk that one of his "friends" is
actually a law enforcement agent.15 7 However, this creates a
false comparison. Attempted comparisons between the
government activity and private party activity ignore the
power differential between the two groups.
Citizens and the police are not the same. We should
never treat them the same. The police can do things that
ordinary citizens cannot, for the most part, do: carry guns, lock
people up, and conduct searches. The police benefit from
default presumptions that ordinary citizens lack: police desires
and actions are presumed to be consonant with their public
protection mission, whereas the same desires and actions by a
private person are presumptively illegal or criminal. The police
are protected from consequences in a way that ordinary
citizens are not.158
Erin Murphy eloquently dissects the power differences
between police and citizens. As a result, individuals may
justifiably maintain a reasonable expectation that they do not
have to assume the risk of accidentally consenting to police
spies conducting secret surveillance even if the same actions
risk exposing the information via third party.
V. CONCLUSION
Reasonableness governs the Fourth Amendment privacy
analysis. Traditionally, legal jurisprudence has not found a
156 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) ("[Wihen public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.")
157 See United States v. Brooks, 2012 WL 6562947, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
2012).
158 Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A
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reasonable expectation of privacy in social media data exposed
to other connections in a private network. A public comment on
a popular blog receives the same privacy protection as a
comment on a private social media page-no privacy protection
at all. This Note considers the possibility of government agents
conducting warrantless searches of an individual's social media
data through either the cooperation of a social network
connection or through covertly friending social media users. In
both scenarios, courts currently allow the government to
monitor and search this information without a warrant. I argue
for a reasonable expectation of privacy in social media data and
a limitation on the third-party doctrine. When applied to two
government surveillance strategies, I find that the government
should have the ability to search information disclosures by
third parties without a search warrant. However, I find that
the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a
search warrant before searching and monitoring information
acquired through the more intrusive covert friending strategy.
Such a search restriction protects citizens from baseless
government monitoring and helps mitigate concerns over a
chilling effect on free speech. A probable cause standard would
restore the proper balance between privacy interests and
legitimate law enforcement interests.
Finally, the reasonable analysis ultimately rests on
normative perspectives. The Supreme Court finds that the "the
correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment." 159 Of course, those values depend on society's
willingness for a government imprint in their private lives.
David Sklansky has suggested that modern Americans no
longer care strongly about data privacy.160 If he is right, then
government surveillance may not constitute as great a harm.
However, Sklansky recognizes that many academics
disagree, 161 and the plaintiffs in Clapper offer empirical
evidence to the contrary. 162 Either way, the Court's
understanding of the Fourth Amendment protections remains
in flux, and the next few years will likely both reflect and
define society's reasonable expectations of privacy in social
data.
159 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984)
160 Sklansky, supra note 3 at 1086 ("people expect less privacy and do less to
preserve it").
161 Id., supra note 3 at 1094-1099.
162 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (finding that
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